The Dynamic Allocation of Burden Doctrine as a Mitigation of the Undesirable Effects of Iqbal’s Pleading Standard by Frías Ossandón, Nicolás J
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-2015
The Dynamic Allocation of Burden Doctrine as a
Mitigation of the Undesirable Effects of Iqbal’s
Pleading Standard
Nicolás J. Frías Ossandón
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicolás J. Frías Ossandón, The Dynamic Allocation of Burden Doctrine as a Mitigation of the Undesirable Effects of Iqbal’s Pleading
Standard, 37 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 185 (2016).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol37/iss2/2
FRIAS_FINAL_FOR_PUB (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2016 2:04 PM 
 
185 
The Dynamic Allocation of Burden Doctrine 
as a Mitigation of the Undesirable Effects of 
Iqbal’s Pleading Standard1 
NICOLÁS J. FRÍAS OSSANDÓN2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the study and proper development of the proce-
dural law doctrines is critical, as it “details the role of government, 
through public courts, in settling disputes, creating new substantive 
rules and policies, and implementing policies through law.”3 
In the context of the civil procedural rules, the structure and stand-
ards of the early dismissal alternatives and the way in which the pretrial 
stage of the judicial process is developed are strongly connected to the 
way in which Governments ensure access to justice to the population. 
According to Professors Clermont and Yeazell, the “early demise pro-
duces great social benefit if, in the end, the facts would not have sup-
ported a judgment for the plaintiff,”4 and a “considerable social harm if, 
in the end, the facts would have supported such a judgment.”5 
Since 2004 the Ministry of Justice of the Chilean Government has 
 
 1. This article was presented by the author in the Third Annual Conference of The Younger 
Comparativists Committee of the American Society of Comparative Law, held in Portland, Ore-
gon on April 4-5 2014 and hosted by the Lewis & Clark Law School. 
 2. Chilean attorney, General Coordinator of the Procedural Reforms Program of the School 
of Law of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.  JD 2010, Pontificia Universidad Católica 
de Chile.  LL.M. 2014, UCLA School of Law.  Before initiating his LL.M. studies, the author 
worked for three years as a legal advisor at the Chilean Ministry of Justice, in the Division in 
charge of the Civil Procedural Reform.  The ideas presented in this paper represent the author’s 
own views.  I owe many thanks for helpful suggestions to Maureen Carroll, Greenberg Law Re-
view Fellow at UCLA School of Law. E-mail address: njfrias@uc.cl   
 3. Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant G. Garth, Ch. 1: Intro. – Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civil 
Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: 16 Civil Procedure 3 
(Mauro Cappelletti ed., (1987).  
 4. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010). 
 5. Id. 
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been committed to the development of a Civil Procedural Reform.6 The 
Reform includes a New Civil Procedural Code (NCPC) currently under 
discussion in the Chilean Congress, and different laws regarding related 
topics such as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, judicial 
fees, and court’s structure.7  When adopted, the NCPC will replace the 
Code that has been in force since 1903, representing a paradigm shift in 
terms of modernization of the judicial system and the due process com-
ponent in judicial proceedings.8 
One of the main features of the NCPC consists in the introduction 
of the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine.9 According to this prin-
ciple, the court may, once the pleading phase has finished and the par-
ties have offered their evidence, allocate the burden of proof between 
the parties, on grounds of the availability and feasibility of the evi-
dence.10 It is conceived as an extraordinary judicial power, with the 
purpose of addressing a procedural inequality caused by the asymmetry 
of information. 
This would have a double positive effect. First, it would work as 
an ex ante incentive to the required party’s commitment and coopera-
tion to the process, strengthening the good faith principle as said party 
would  know the effects of non-cooperation. The second effect is that it 
would contribute to reduce judicial error in the courts’ decisions, as this 
tool improves the odds of delivering judgments more likely to reflect 
the “material truth” of the dispute. 
In this article, I examine the pleading standard of the United States 
procedural system, analyzing from a critical perspective the changes 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Twombly11 and Iqbal,12 where the Su-
preme Court incorporated the plausibility criterion of the pleading 
standard. Then, I describe in a comparative way the Chilean Procedural 
Reform and its decisions concerning the pleading standard, including a 
description and analysis of the dynamic allocation of burden doctrine as 
 
 6. B. no. 8197-07 (Chile) (approved by the Chamber of Deputies, but under debate in the 
Senate), available at  
  http://www.camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx?prmID=8596&prmBL=8197-07. However, the 
Chamber of Deputies did not approve this doctrine, and was withdrawn from the Bill that passed 
to the discussion at the Senate, stage that the Government may use to insist with this doctrine. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Cód. Civ. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile/BCN [Chilean Library of Con-
gress], available at  http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=22740&idParte=0. 
 9. Proposal to Reform Civil Procedure System of Chile, Ministry of Justice of Chile, 
http://rpc.minjusticia.gob.cl/media/2013/04/Informe-Procesal-Civil-Foro.pdf.  
 10. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6. 
 11. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 12. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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an alternative to mitigate the non-desirable effects of said pleading 
standard. 
Therefore this article proceeds as follows. Part One provides a de-
scription of the U.S. pleading standard and discusses the current debate 
over the controversial decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 
Twombly and Iqbal. Part Two describes the Chilean Civil Procedural 
Process and highlights some features of its reform, with special analysis 
of the dynamic allocation of burden doctrine. Finally, the final Part con-
tains a study and proposal of the incorporation of that doctrine to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER THE U.S. PROCEDURAL SYSTEM 
A. Previous Rule: Description of the Pre-Iqbal Standard13 
The main elements required to file a complaint in the United States 
are stated in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).14 
The critical requisite is specified in Rule 8(a)(2), which states that the 
complaint has to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”15 
Before Twombly and Iqbal, the case that illustrated the application 
of this rule was Conley v. Gibson.16  In Conley, the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”17 In other words, the plaintiff had to show to the court (i.e. it had 
to appear to the court) that his or her case was not clearly (i.e. beyond 
doubt) one in which he or she would not be able to prove any set of 
supportive facts that would entitle him or her to further relief. 
This standard is clearly exemplified by the same drafters of the 
FRCP in its Form 11,18 which, as stated in Rule 84, “suffice[s] under 
these rules [FRCP] and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these 
rules contemplate.”19 Said form is worthy to be reproduced entirely, as it 
reflects what the words “short” and “plain” meant for the rule makers: 
“(Caption—See Form 1.) 
 
 13. Id. As Iqbal confirmed and deepened Twombly’s pleading standard criteria, I will center 
the analysis only on that last case. 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 16. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 17. Id. at 45-46. 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 84. 
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1. (Statement of Jurisdiction—See Form 7.) 
2. On [date], at [place], the defendant negligently drove a mo-
tor vehicle against the plaintiff. 
3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages 
or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred 
medical expenses of $_______. 
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defend-
ant for $_______, plus costs. 
(Date and sign—See Form 2).” 
This form contains only succinct and conclusory statements that 
prevent arguing “over the formulation of the grievance, but makes start-
ing a lawsuit unsupported by evidence very easy.”20  With that standard 
one can criticize that it enables unscrupulous plaintiffs to easily meet 
that pleading requirement and file ungrounded suits for intimidation 
purposes that infringe upon the good faith principle and cause injury to 
the defendant. 
Consequently, the core question to be analyzed is: how can such a 
broad pleading standard protect defendants from frivolous litigation? 
The drafters of the FRCP addressed that concern not inside the requi-
sites of the complaint itself but in the design of the procedural system as 
a whole.21  “The motivating theory [of having this low pleading stand-
ard] was that the stages subsequent to [the] pleading [phase]–disclosure, 
discovery, pretrial conferences, summary judgment, and [finally the] 
trial–could more efficiently and fairly handle functions such as narrow-
ing issues and revealing facts, and, thus, the whole system could better 
deliver a proper decision on the merits.”22 
Therefore, the purpose of this “broad” pleading stage was nothing 
more than to “give fair notice of the pleader’s basic contentions to the 
adversary,”23 without any judicial assessment of the facts or of the merit 
of the allegations, and leaving to the remaining pretrial actions the task 
of gathering and evaluating the evidence needed to sustain a trial.24 
In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a judicial 
tool, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, “against a party 
 
 20. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 825. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 11; see Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing 
Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010); see also Ramzi 
Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards 
Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1443, 1468-69 (2010).  
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who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party’s case:”25 summary judgment. 
Thus, the judicial procedural system was designed to preempt su-
perfluous or uncontroversial claims from reaching trial (with the sum-
mary judgment), but at the same time, as noted above, was elaborated to 
assure everyone that his or her case would not be rejected if it states the 
claim shortly and plainly and shows its entitlement to relief.26 
From the public policy perspective that sustained this pleading 
standard, two principles can be found in dispute: (i) the efficiency in the 
use of the public resources; and (ii) the substantial or material justice as 
the goal of the procedural system.27 Observing these criteria, the U.S. 
procedural system, under the pre-Iqbal pleading standard, weighted jus-
tice over efficiency, leaving, mainly to the parties, the burden of the un-
desirable effects of ungrounded pretrial actions (i.e. the cost of the dis-
covery proceeding).28 
In addition, one can notice that it is an issue of proof availability: 
all the acts, procedures and rules that govern the pretrial phase were de-
signed to provide the facts that may, or may not, enable the plaintiff to 
sustain a trial.29 As it is described below, in Twombly and Iqbal, the Su-
preme Court allocated this goal of the pretrial phase into the very first 
stage of it, i.e. in the motion to dismiss; weighing the efficiency princi-
ple over justice, with all the potentially adverse effects to the judicial 
system.30 
B. Current Standard: Plausibility 
1. Description of the Standard 
Two recent cases from the Supreme Court of the United States 
“have stirred the world of pleading civil litigation.”31  The first case was 
 
 25. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 329 (“. . .to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action.”); Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to 
Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1714, 1719, 1729 (2013) (Iqbal increases efficiency). 
 28. See Douglas Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 
OR. L. REV. 1053, 1070-71 (2009). 
 29. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 545; Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Plead-
ing Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2005 
(2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010); see Kassem supra note 24, at 1468-1470 (allowing limited dis-
covery could uncover necessary facts). 
 30. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 545; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  
 31. Robin J. Effron, supra note 29, at 51.   
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Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly (2007)32 and the second was Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal (2009).33 
Twombly was a class action case between multiple Internet and tel-
ephone subscribers and a few large telecommunications companies, 
where the plaintiffs claimed an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.34 
The plaintiffs described the parallel conduct in detail and further alleged 
the existence of an illegal agreement by defendant, but in conclusory 
terms as they had no proof in hand.35  In this case, “the obvious con-
cern. . .was that the claims opened the door to expensive discovery.”36 
Consequently, “the Court upheld dismissal on a pre-answer motion,”37 
because the plaintiff failed to meet the admissibility standard by not 
showing the agreement amongst the competitors.38 According to the 
Court in Twombly, asking for plausible grounds “calls for enough fact[s] 
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
illegal agreement;”39  but in this case “nothing contained in the com-
plaint invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible sug-
gestion of conspiracy.”40 
This case was controversial and, as noted above, represented a 
deep modification to the pleading stage of judicial proceedings.41 It add-
ed the “plausibility” criterion to the pleading standard analysis and 
raised the level needed for a claim to survive a motion to dismiss.42 In so 
ruling, the Court instituted the need for a “judicial inquiry into the 
pleading’s convincingness.”43 Two years later, said turn would be reaf-
firmed and strengthened by the Supreme Court, when issuing Iqbal. 
In Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim sued numerous important federal of-
ficials, including a former Attorney General of the United States, alleg-
ing that they “adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected re-
spondent to harsh conditions of confinement on account of [his] race, 
religion or national origin.”44 Once the legal proceeding was initiated, 
the defendants moved to dismiss “for failure to state sufficient allega-
 
 32. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 544.  
 33. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)12. 
 34. See generally Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 544 
 35. Id. at 556.  
 36. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 826. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556. 
 40. Id. at 566. 
 41. Id. at 545.  
 42. Id. at 560; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 829-30.  
 43. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 827. 
 44. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. 
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tions to show their own involvement in clearly established unconstitu-
tional conduct.”45 
Once the district court denied their motion, the defendants, invok-
ing the collateral-order doctrine, filed an interlocutory appeal in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.46 Said tribunal 
considered Twombly’s applicability to this case, and concluded that 
Twombly called for “a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a 
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those con-
texts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausi-
ble.”47  The court considered that this case did not present one of those 
contexts where amplification was needed, so it held plaintiff’s com-
plaint “adequate to allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discrimi-
natory decisions.”48 However, in his concurrence, Judge Cabranes urged 
the Supreme Court of the United States to “address the appropriate 
pleading standard ‘at the earliest opportunity,”49 and the Court granted 
certiorari. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and held that the plain-
tiff’s complaint “fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for pur-
poseful and unlawful discrimination” against the defendants.50  Contrary 
to Conley, which set forth the no-set-of-facts criteria to grant a motion 
to dismiss, in Iqbal even though “the plausibility standard is not akin to 
a ‘probability requirement’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility 
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”51 
In Iqbal the Court reaffirmed and explained the shift of Twombly. 
In words of Justice Kennedy: 
“Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. 
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allega-
tions contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclu-
sions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . 
Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-
technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not 
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with noth-
ing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that 
 
 45. Id. at 669. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.  
 48. Id. at 670. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 687.  
 51. Id. at 678. 
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states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dis-
miss . . . Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 
claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 
on its judicial experience and common sense. . . But where the 
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than 
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has al-
leged—but it has not “show[n]”—”that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).”52 [Emphasis added] 
In other terms, there is a line from ‘conceivability’ (Conley) to 
‘plausibility’ (Twombly and Iqbal) that the plaintiff must pass in order 
to survive a motion to dismiss.53  Now, if a plaintiff wants his or her 
case to enter into the disclosure and discovery phases, he or she has to 
make plausible the existence of certain material facts that can sustain a 
judgment in his or her favor.54 
2. Iqbal Scholars’ Analysis 
The impact of these cases in the judicial community was and still 
is of critical significance.  Since its issuance by the Supreme Court in 
2009, Iqbal has been cited in 71,190 cases, in 65,015 trial courts docu-
ments and in 9,457 appellate court documents.55  In order to weigh those 
numbers, we have to compare them with other relevant cases, such as 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993)56 regarding the 
admission of expert evidence, which was cited in 16,257 cases and in 
60,635 trial court documents;57 or Roe v. Wade (1973)58 worldwide case 
regarding abortion and women rights, which has been cited in 3,828 
cases, 1,143 trial court documents and in 3,832 appellate court docu-
ments.59 
However, Iqbal caused a great impact not only to the judicial prac-
tice but to the academic analysis as well: 1,135 references in Law Re-
views and 1,456 in other secondary sources only in 3 years.60  Below is 
provided a brief description of the main arguments stated by the sup-
porters and detractors of this new pleading standard. 
 
 52. Id. at 678-79 (emphasis added). 
 53. Kassem, supra note 24, at 1449.  
 54. Id.  at 1444.  
 55. According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014).  
 56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 57. According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014). 
 58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 59. According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014). 
 60. According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014). 
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a. Iqbal’s supporters 
There are three main categories of the defenses to Iqbal’s pleading 
standard:61 (i) those who believe that the decision is consistent with the 
intent of the Advisory Committee and with the inherent doctrine of the 
Rule; (ii) those who assure that it has not had any impact on the rate at 
which the grant of motion to dismiss has terminated cases; and (iii) 
those who esteem that it was a good shift in the pleading standard in 
terms of the efficiency of the system and good faith criteria.62 
The first group of supporters believes that with this decision the 
Supreme Court did nothing but accept a long practice traditionally rec-
ognized by the courts regarding the legal conclusions in a claim.63 For 
this position, the “plausibility standard of Twombly can be understood 
as equivalent to the traditional insistence that a factual inference be rea-
sonable.”64 In other words, for the supporters of this interpretation, the 
requisites of the Rule 8(a)(2) have always implied a “plausibility” revi-
sion. This group also contains those scholars who believe that this was 
only a nominal change of the same pleading standard, and those who 
state that this recent decision did reaffirm the original sense of the Rule 
8(a)(2).65 
The second set of defendants of Iqbal sustains that “the effects of 
the revision to pleading standards ushered in Twombly and Iqbal have 
been negligible, meaning that concern over the change is much ado 
about little or nothing.”66  The supporters of this position provide two 
main reasons.67 First, because the Court’s decision does not represent a 
change but an alignment with preexisting lower court’s pleading ap-
proaches, the impact will be minimal.68 The second reason provided is 
that there are studies that show that there is no impact at all regarding 
the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss has terminated cases.69 
Therefore, as Iqbal and Twombly’s pleading standard does not represent 
any change to the current procedural law, there is not a new challenge or 
 
 61. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apolo-
gists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1713 (2013). 
 62. Id. at 1713-14.  
 63. Id. at 1713 
 64. Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474  
(2010). 
 65. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1715-1720. 
 66. Id. at 1720. 
 67. Id. at 1721, 1725.  
 68. Id.  
 69. JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES, MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011). 
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concern regarding the guarantees of the judicial system. 
The third group of supporters sustains the efficiency defense.70 The 
members of this group “not only recognize the change –they laud it.”71  
The main issue here is the concern about the abuse of discovery that a 
lower standard may cause, with all the associated costs to the defend-
ants.72 They argue that this change represents a good orientation and de-
creases the risks associated to expensive discoveries.73 Furthermore, 
they state that a low standard empowers frivolous litigation and pro-
motes extortionate settlements.74As affirmed by Professor Bone, this ar-
gument basically states that “as the costs of litigation increase and the 
scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent pleading stand-
ards increases.”75 
Therefore, according to this position, neither the efficiency nor the 
fairness criterion is achieved in a system that allows claims with dubi-
ous merits to proceed, as it opens the gate to settlements not grounded 
on the merits of the dispute, but in the prospective costs of the defend-
ant to continuing in that litigation.76 In other terms, this perspective 
states that plaintiffs cannot access discovery “until they can pay the new 
price of admission –a demonstration of factual support sufficient to ren-
der their claims plausible.”77 
b. Iqbal’s detractors 
It is not hard to infer that under Iqbal’s criteria, a case that passes a 
motion to dismiss needs to be stronger than before.78 If we understand 
the main words of Rule 8(a) (short, plain and show) in their common 
use and sense in light of the Conley interpretation of the Rule, then it is 
hard to assume in advance the plausibility requirement that came after 
Iqbal. Thus, the plausibility criterion of review is a new one and was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court in the cases under analysis.79 
Consequently, the question that needed to be answered when in-
creasing the standard is: how can a judicial system achieve its main 
 
 70. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1713-14, 1728. 
 71. , Id. at 1728. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Robert P. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 873  (2009). 
 75. Smith, supra note 28, at 1055.. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1729. 
 78. Id. at 1732.  
 79. Id. at 1716.  
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purpose, which is to impart justice to people? When analyzing this is-
sue, one has to take into account that for the plaintiff, “offering such 
facts [required in a complaint post-Iqbal] before discovery begins seems 
particularly problematic for claimants alleging concealed wrongdo-
ing.”80 
But even without considering the strong question as to the discov-
ery cost argument that makes more evident the inadequacy of this high-
er standard,81 the system of justice has to be designed to achieve its 
main goal, which is, again, to deliver justice to everyone who requires 
it. 
Therefore, in Iqbal the core goal of the judicial system is not tra-
duced as the main principle of the system and their limitations as excep-
tions. By the contrary, with the plausibility standard, it seems that the 
rule is to preempt access to the system of justice and the exception is to 
survive a motion to dismiss.82 Conley contains an important public poli-
cy view stating that the general rule of a complaint is not to be dis-
missed “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”83 
(Emphasis added.) It is a strong pro access to justice rule that has a di-
rect impact on society. It is important to take into account that “[h]ow 
much law regulates social behavior depends in large part on how the 
machinery of justice is constructed.”84 
In addition, the subjectivity of the plausibility standard is quite ev-
ident. According to Professor Kassem, “Iqbal seems to have trans-
formed judicial gut instinct into a gate-keeping mechanism.”85 As there 
is not enough clarity about what plausibility means, each judge will 
ground his or her dismissal or non-dismissal decisions with different 
criteria.86 That scenario entails a direct impact on the basic citizens’ 
guarantees from the equal protection clause perspective and also from 
the economic perspective, as judicial uncertainty is not an incentive to 
preempt litigation but to encourage it.87 
As the law professor and circuit judge Richard Posner has stated, 
 
 80. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 185, 188 (2010) [hereinafter Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure]. 
 81. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1729-33. 
 82. Id. at 1731-32. 
 83. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.  
 84. Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
 85. See Kassem, supra note 24, at 1446. 
 86. Id. at 1447; see Kang & Bennett et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. 
Rev., 1124, 1160 (2012). 
 87. Kassem, supra note 24, at 1481; Spencer, supra note 61, at 1724.  
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“The [Supreme] Court said in Iqbal that the ‘plausibility standard is not 
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”88 He goes on and ex-
pressly criticizes the ambiguity of the plausibility standard. Judge Pos-
ner states that “[t]his is a little unclear because plausibility, probability, 
and possibility overlap. . . The fact that the allegations undergirding a 
claim could be true is no longer enough to save a complaint from being 
dismissed; the complaint must establish a nonnegligible probability 
that the claim is valid.”89 (Emphasis added.) 
Finally, I believe that this new standard, especially considering its 
ambiguity as stated above, implies some other due process concerns 
from the defendants’ position as well. If a court in a civil case -where 
the common standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence90- de-
cides, even without any discovery or disclosure proceeding, that the 
claimant’s allegations are “plausible,” how likely is it to change its 
opinion in the final judgment? 
Moreover, if the court has found “plausible” certain allegations, 
how neutral is its interpretation of the evidence? Is it going to approach 
the evidence trying to confirm its previous decision or trying to decide 
in a completely independent way? As the proof standard in these cases 
is related to the likelihood of certain sets of facts instead of others, one 
can infer that the early “plausibility” decision of the court may turn 
practically into a final pronouncement over the likeliness of the evi-
dence in the case, and therefore, into a strong “persuasion” of the direc-
tion of the final judgment. Among other effects, that situation can pro-
duce an important harm to the negotiation power of the defendant and it 
could strengthen disproportionately the plaintiff’s bargaining power. 
Professors Kang, Carbado, Casey, Dasgupta, Faigman, Godsil, 
Greenwald, Levinson and Mnookin, and Judge Bennett have analyzed 
the implicit bias in the Courtroom in multidisciplinary research.91 When 
analyzing the effects of Iqbal and Twombly, they assert that in cases 
where we “lack sufficient individuating information -which is largely 
the state of affairs at the motion to dismiss stage- we have no choice but 
to rely more heavily on our schemas.”92  Then, they raise the applicabil-
ity of the social judgeability theory to this case, which states that “there 
 
 88. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. Ill. 2010). 
 89. Id. (emphasis added). 
 90. 42 C.F.R. § 93.219 (2005) (i.e. proof by information that, compared with that opposing 
it, leads to the conclusion that the fact at issue is more probably true than not). 
 91. See generally Kang et al., supra note 86, at 1124.  
 92. Id. at 1160. 
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are social rules that tell us when it is appropriate to judge someone.”93  
According to the authors, since Iqbal made dismissals easier, we should 
see a growth in dismissal rates and with more inference of implicit or 
explicit bias.94 
Now that I have described from a historical and critical perspective 
the U.S. pleading standard, in the next section, I will explain how it 
works in the projected Chilean civil procedure.  There I will describe 
and explain how the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine could be an 
interesting solution to some cases where the manifest asymmetry of in-
formation between the parties makes it impossible for the plaintiff to 
meet the plausibility standard. 
III. CHILE’S PLEADING STANDARD UNDER THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURAL 
CODE (“NCPC”) 
Since 2004, the Government of Chile has been designing a new set 
of codes, statutes, and institutions aimed at improving the standards of 
civil justice.95  It constitutes a paradigm shift in the way in which civil 
and commercial cases are going to be developed and in terms of mod-
ernization of the judicial service as a whole. 
A. Summary of the Current Chilean Civil Procedural System 
The Chilean civil procedure has three main phases: the discussion 
phase; the evidence phase; and the judgment phase.96 The discussion 
phase is initiated with the filing of the lawsuit or by the request of a 
prejudicial injunction.97  Once the plaintiff has properly submitted the 
suit, he – at his own expense and through judicial official – has to notify 
the defendant, who then has 15, 18 or a maximum of 30 days (depend-
ing on his location) to oppose pre-answer motions or to respond to and 
sue the plaintiff on the same factual grounds (cross-claim).  The pre-
answer motions are procedural, (e.g. lack of court’s jurisdiction, pend-
ing process, lack of formalities in the complaint98) and substantive (i.e. 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1163 (“[T]he more gap filling and inferential thinking that a judge has to engage 
in, the more room there may be for explicit and implicit biases to structure the judge’s assessment 
in the absence of a well-developed evidentiary record.”). 
 95. See generally Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile [Chilean National Library of 
Congress], Código de Procedimiento Civil [Civil Procedure Code] (2014), available at 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=22740&idParte=0 [hereinafter Chilean Library of 
Congress].  
 96. See Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 253.  
 97. Chilean Library of Congress, supra note 95.  
 98. See Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 303. 
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res judicata, transaction, prescription and payment99).  If the court es-
teems that this last group of motions needed to be resolved after a 
sounding procedure, it may order the defendant to respond and would 
reserve the decision over these motions to the judgment of the case.  
Once the court’s decision over the pre-answer motion has been made 
and the case has survived, the defendant has ten days to respond.100 
Six days after the submission of the response by the defendant, the 
plaintiff has to reply.101 Then, the defendant responds to the plaintiff’s 
reply, and the court calls the parties to a Conciliation Conference and 
promotes the basis of a judicial agreement.102 This conference has not 
shown good results in finishing cases through settlement.103 
The second phase is the evidence term, which starts with a court 
resolution that indicates the controversial facts that need to be proven 
and which evidence is required.104 This term is also developed in writ-
ing65F that thoroughly regulates each type of evidence that can be pro-
vided and the way in which the judge must evaluate it.105 Each piece of 
evidence is presented to the court in writing and there are judicial con-
ferences for the production of certain proof (i.e. witnesses’ declaration 
and electronic documents).106 
Finally, the procedure finishes with the judgment stage.107 Once the 
evidence term is completed, which regularly has to be within twenty 
days after the opening of the evidence term plus ten days of parties’ ob-
servation, no further evidence is accepted except those ordered by the 
judge, and the court has to dictate a resolution that “calls the parties to 
 
 99. See id. art. 304. 
 100. Id. art. 408; Chilean Library of Congress, supra note 95, at art. 308. 
 101. Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 698.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Ministerio de Justicia, Informe Final: Panel de Expertos Modelo Organico para la in-
corporacion de Sistemas Alternativos de Resolucion de Conflictos [Final Report: Panel of Experts 
for the Incorporation of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems], (2013), available at 
http://rpc.minjusticia.gob.cl/media/2013/07/Informe-Final-SARC.pdf (Chile) (The Conciliation 
Conference was adopted in an Amendment to the CPC made through the passing of Law No 
19.334 on October 7, 1994. Its purpose was to promote the achieved settlements and to reduce the 
courts’ workload. However, according to data from the Ministry of Justice, in 2010 out of 
1,656,003 civil cases, only 1,127 were completed by this Conciliation Conference). 
 104. Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 318.  
 105. The evidence is presented and produced in writing, with exception to the witnesses’ dec-
laration that is held in a conference in the tribunal.  Also, there is a specific audience to debate 
over the veracity of electronic documents (Article 348 bis of the Cód. Proc. Civ.).  It is in writing 
in terms of the communication between the judge and the parties and as a general rule of present-
ing and producing evidence. 
 106. See Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 348. 
 107. Id. art. 158 
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hear judgment.”108 From the date of that resolution, the court has to is-
sue the final judgment within sixty days.109 
From a comparative perspective, the current Chilean civil proce-
dural system has all the features attributed to the procedural civil law 
tradition.110 First, it endorsed total predominance to the written compo-
nent.111 In the Chilean Civil Procedure the principle “quod non est in 
actis non est in mundo, (procedural acts not reduced to writing are null 
and void)” is entirely applicable as the tribunal is mandated to base its 
decision exclusively upon the written record.112 Second, it is character-
ized by the so-called formal or legal system of proof: the assessment of 
evidence is accurately established in the law under almost mathematical 
rules.113 Finally, it tends to discourage any direct contact between the 
tribunal and the parties, the witnesses or any other source of infor-
mation.114 The system is not designed to facilitate encounters of the par-
ties with the judge, instead court officials almost always receive the 
witness’ declaration, party confession and, in general, the evidence.115 
B. Highlights of a Major Procedural Reform and Commonality 
with the U.S. Procedural System 
The procedure briefly described above is stated in book two of the 
Chilean Civil Procedure Code.116 The CPC was approved in 1903 -its 
drafting began in the 1890’s- in the context of the necessities of a rather 
nascent society, with a commercial and legal situation much different 
from that of today.117 As stated before, it is mainly in writing, contem-
plates rigid and time-consuming procedures, was designed under past 
procedural principles (e.g. the evidence stage is developed in writing, 
only certain evidence is accepted and its valuation is according to a 
plain measure stated in the CPC) and it is deployed under insufficient 
 
 108. Id. arts. 328, 572, 688.  
 109. Id. art. 162.  
 110. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 3, at 5. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. A translation could be “the elements that are not in the judicial record, are not in the 
world [of the judge],” which means that the Tribunal, when deciding the dispute, must consider 
exclusively the written record as stated in the judicial file of the case.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Ministerio de Justicia, Informe Final:  Estudio de Analisis de Trayectoria de las Causas 
civiles en los tribunales civiles de Santiago [Analytical Study of the Track record of civil causes 
in the civil courts of Santiago], (May 2011), available at 
http://rpc.minjusticia.gob.cl/media/2013/04/Estudio-Trayectorias-Causas-Civiles-en-Tribunales-
Civiles-Santiago.pdf (Chile). 
 117. See generally B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 3. 
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judicial technology and infrastructure.118 
Even though one can notice that the timing of the judicial acts stat-
ed in the CPC is reasonable, according to a study conducted by the 
Chilean Ministry of Justice, on average, a civil claim in the courts of 
Santiago lasts 803 days from the file of the suit to the judgment of the 
inferior court.119 However, if the duration of the appeal process is con-
sidered (that stays the execution of the judgment of the inferior court) 
the average final number of days exceeds 1500.120 
Therefore, since 2004 the Ministry of Justice of the Chilean Justice 
is dedicated to the design of a major Reform to the Civil Procedural 
System. Its keystones are the following:121 
(i) A new Civil Procedural Code that brings an updated pro-
cedure developed mainly through hearings before a judge 
with improved case management powers, including the 
corresponding use of technologies in notifications, liberty 
in the presentation of evidence and grounded validation of 
them directly by the judge; 
(ii) An Alternative Dispute Resolution Network, which facili-
tates the practice of professional mediation and arbitration 
in commercial and civil disputes;122 
(iii) The subtraction of the enforcement of the judgments and 
other executive titles from the Judicature, settling it into 
independent sheriffs called “execution officials;”123 and fi-
nally 
(iv) The strengthening of the role of the Supreme Court as a 
warrant of the constitutionality of the judicial decisions of 
all other national courts, giving it discretion in the selec-
tion of cases and promoting its role as unifier of jurispru-
dence. 
All these changes require a profound reform to the organic struc-
ture of the judicial power, which would mainly translate into an ade-
quate instruction of judges and the required education of all the legal 
 
 118. Cód. Civ., supra note 8 at 43. 
 119. Estudio de Analisis de Trayectoria de las Causas civiles en los tribunales civiles de San-
tiago, supra note 117, at 106.  
 120.  Id. at 9. In addition, said study states that there is an excessive extension of time be-
tween the communication of the claim to the defendant and the end of the discussion phase (237 
days); and of the evidence term (315 days). 
 121. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 3. 
 122. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6. 
 123. Ministerio de Justicia, Informe Final, supra note 103 (It is a model inspired in the “Hus-
sier de Justice” of France.). 
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community. 
The NCPC establishes a common civil procedure with a simple 
and clear structure. The process starts with a written pretrial or discus-
sion phase, comprehended mainly by the suit and its response and/or its 
pre-answer motions. Afterwards, there is a preliminary conference, 
where the court prepares the trial by, among other things, addressing the 
pre-answer motions, defining the scope of the dispute and the evidence 
that is going to be rendered in trial and by proposing a basis for settle-
ment. Then comes the trial, where the evidence is rendered and cross-
examined to a public audience in front of the judge. Finally there is the 
judgment phase, where the judge has a limited time of 10 days (that can 
be increased in a few exceptions) to issue the judgment, subject to an 
ipso iure nullity of the trial and disciplinary sanctions. 
As one can observe, this new process presents similarities to the 
U.S. procedural system, regarding the structure of the process and the 
role of the judge in the valuation of the evidence. The two processes are 
mainly developed through hearings in front of the judge, where the par-
ties are free to introduce any evidence that may sustain their case, and it 
has to be analyzed and valuated by the judge in an oral trial that assures 
a proper cross-examination by the parties, under his own presence 
(something that is not guaranteed in the current Chilean system). All of 
those elements from an American legal tradition are essential features of 
civil litigation and are totally new to the Chilean civil system of Jus-
tice.124 
Additionally, the NCPC contemplates the power to the Supreme 
Court to select the cases that it wants to hear; as long as it esteems that 
those cases are of general interest on two broad grounds stated in the 
former Article 409.125 This power to select the cases and its role as uni-
fier of jurisprudence, that is part of the essentials of the U.S. Legal Sys-
tem, was totally new to the Chilean system.126 
 
 124. Even though, those principles are not new to the Chilean Judicial System as a whole, as 
in the year 2000 the new Criminal Procedural Code was implemented, then in 2004 the new Fam-
ily Justice system was deployed and finally in 2008 the same was done to the new Labor Justice 
System. All of those reforms introduced the modern procedural principles stated above and con-
tributed to modernize the judicial system. Additionally, there is another similarity with the U.S. 
system in relation to the new role of the Supreme Court.   
 125. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 150. 
 126. However, in the final discussion at the Chamber of Deputies (May 2014), the representa-
tives chose to reject that provision from the NCPC. The Ministry of Justice is currently studying 
its reincorporation at the Senate’s discussion. 
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C. Pretrial Phase Under the NCPC 
Article 253 of the NCPC states the requirements of the pleading.127  
Number 4 requires “the exposition of each point of fact that sustains the 
requests of the lawsuit, a direct indication of the evidence that will be 
used to prove the groundings of the case and of the laws that sustain the 
case.”128  In addition, when filing a complaint, the plaintiff must attach 
all the documents that he or she is about to use on trial as evidence and 
offer to join expert reports, witnesses statements and any other evi-
dence.129 
The Message of the NCPC states the reason of these require-
ments.130  It argues that the Executive is convinced of the “need to re-
quire [in plaintiffs] seriousness and real grounds when deciding to file a 
judicial complaint, therefore the Bill demands . . . that the actor, along 
with the attachment of all the documentary evidence available and with 
the list of all the witnesses and experts that he will use on trial, must de-
clare the rest of the evidence that he would use to prove, and request its 
completion.”131  Therefore, the principle here is to void frivolous litiga-
tion of ungrounded or disproportionable requests and irresponsible 
complaints filed only for settlement purposes. 
Nonetheless, this claimant’s requirement of submitting all the evi-
dence with the lawsuit has three important mitigations.  First, in contrast 
to Iqbal where the Court has to review the requisites of the complaint on 
a subjective basis, here not “plausibility” or pre evaluation on the merits 
is applicable.132  The court’s evaluation is objective.  The issue here is 
that, as a general rule, the plaintiff only can use the evidence provided, 
requested or stated in his or her suit.133 
However, and here is the second nuance, if a party does not have 
any document that he or she needs for Article 253 paragraph 4 purposes, 
the NCPC allows the party to require the Court to order the incorpora-
tion of the required documents to the file of the case.134  Also, the parties 
can request the practice of several evidentiary diligences; and even the 
court can request itself the practice and incorporation of evidence into 
 
 127. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 104.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 104-105  
 130. See generally id. at 1-42.  
 131. Id. at 33-34. 
 132. Id. at 53; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).  
 133. See B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 104. With the few exceptions stated in the NCPC. 
E.g. evidence regarding new facts dated after the file of the suit or proven to be unknown by the 
party that wants to introduce it (Article 276 NCPC).  
 134. Id. at 104. 
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the process.135  The focus of the NCPC is not in who introduces the evi-
dence but with which guarantees that evidence is incorporated into the 
process (i.e. allowing a proper cross-examination and a public hearing 
in front of the judge). 
Finally, as the third nuance to consider, one can find the dynamic 
allocation of burdens doctrine, which I will briefly develop below. 
D. Dynamic Allocation of Burdens Doctrine 
1. Description of the Doctrine136 
One of the most interesting – and controversial – features of the 
NCPC is the incorporation of the dynamic allocation of burdens doc-
trine.  The second paragraph of the Article 296 of the NCPC states as 
follows: 
“The Court may allocate the burden of proof in accordance to the 
availability and feasibility of the evidence of each party, a decision that 
the Court shall notify to the parties with due anticipation [in the prelim-
inary audience], in light of the consequences that the Court decision 
may have for the parties’ obligation to present evidence.”137 
 
 135. Id. at 77-78.  
 136. At a comparative doctrine level, many different authors have contributed to the devel-
opment of this doctrine.  Some significant authors and their relevant works are: Leo Rosemberg, 
La carga de la prueba, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa América, Third Edition, (1956); Alvaro Luna 
Yerga, Regulación de la carga de la prueba en la LEC. En particular, la prueba de la culpa en 
los procesos de responsabilidad civil médico-sanitaria, InDret (2003); Osvaldo Gozani, La pre-
sunción de inocencia. Del proceso penal al proceso civil, Revista Latinoamericana de Derecho, 
III Year, No. 6, 155-179 (July - December 2006); Raquel Castillejo Manzanares, La carga de la 
prueba en el proceso civil por responsabilidad médica, Diario La Ley, No. 6563, XXVII Year 
(October 4, 2006); Jorge W. Peyrano & Inés Lépori White, Cargas Probatorias Dinámicas, (Ru-
binzal Culzoni ed., Buenos Aires, 2008); Julio Pérez Gil, Probar la discriminación. Una mirada 
a las normas sobre la carga de la prueba en la ley de igualdad, in Oralidad y Escritura en un 
Proceso Civil Eficiente, Carpi & Ortells Ramos Ed., t. II, Universitàt de València, 211-224 
(2008); Michele Taruffo, La prueba, (Marcial Pons ed., 2008). Rolf Stürner, La obtención de in-
formación probatoria en el proceso civil, Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católi-
ca de Valparaíso XXX, 1º Semestre, 243 – 262 (2008); Diego Palomo Véliz, Los deberes de aviso 
e información del juez y de esclarecimiento y colaboración de las partes, in Reforma procesal 
civil, oralidad y poderes del juez (Legal Publishing ed., Colección Derecho y Proceso, 369-380, 
2010); Hanns Prütting, Carga de la prueba y estándar probatorio: La Influencia de Leo Rosen-
berg y Karl Hainz Schwab para el desarrollo del moderno Derecho probatorio, 1 Ius et Praxis, 
16 Year, 453 – 464 (2010); Guilermo Ormazábal Sánchez, Discriminación y Carga de la Prueba 
en el Proceso Civil (Marcial Pons ed., Madrid, 2011); Juan Montero Aroca, Derecho jurisdiccio-
nal II. Proceso civil, (Tirant lo Blanch ed., Valencia, 2009); Juan Montero Aroca, La prueba en el 
proceso civil (Editorial Civitas ed., Pamplona, 2011). 
 137. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 116 (“El tribunal podra distribuir de la prueba conforme 
a la disponibilidad y facilidad probatoria que posea cada una de las partes en el litigio lo que co-
municará a ellas, con la debida antelación, para que asuman las consecuencias que les pueda ge-
nerar la ausencia o insuficiencia de material probatorio que hayan debido aportar o no rendir la 
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It is conceived as an extraordinary power, needed in cases of 
asymmetry of information between the parties that can affect the equali-
ty principle.138  It has to be understood in a judicial system designed to 
obtain the substantial truth of the case, which seeks a total application of 
the cooperation and good faith principles.139  In that context and as stat-
ed above, it is not important who brings the evidence to the Court, but 
the way in which it is rendered (i.e. with cross-examination and in a 
public audience in front of the judge) and weighed by the court (i.e. ac-
cording to the “sound criticism” or “reasoned judgment” of the court 
contrary to a fixed legal standard of proof).140 
The ‘dynamic’ part of the name was adopted with the finality to 
oppose it to a static or fixed idea of valuation of the evidence and to 
show its ability to adapt to discrete cases.141 Therefore, the dynamic al-
location of burdens doctrine relies on the principle that the distributive 
rule of the burden of proof does not respond to inflexible principles: it 
must be adapted to each case, according to the nature of the alleged or 
denied facts and to the availability and feasibility to prove.142 
An example is useful to illustrate this doctrine. A patient was in-
jured in a medical procedure of a large hospital and wants to sue to re-
cover damages for medical malpractice. All the video records of the op-
eration, the names of the specialists that took part in the process and 
different details of the injury are known and stored only by the hospital. 
 
prueba correspondiente de que dispongan en su poder.”). As noted above in supra note 9, this 
provision was withdrawn from the Bill by the Camber of Deputies, waiting for its inclusion by 
the Senate in the current discussion. 
 138. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 18 (The purpose of this doctrine is to correct eventual 
inequalities between the parties.). 
 139. Id. at 17, 44 (Article 13 of the NCPC states that the judge when applying the procedural 
rules “has to take into account that the purpose of the rules is the effectiveness of the rights stated 
in the substantive law, and that in the expeditious treatment of the judicial procedures and in the 
just resolution of the conflicts subject to its jurisdiction, the public interest is committed.” In addi-
tion, the Message of the NCPC (§IV.1) states “the parties have to have access to the civil proce-
dure in equality conditions, with the right to obtain a resolution over the grounds of the dispute, if 
not settled by other dispute resolution mechanism. A judgment that does not resolve the merits of 
the dispute because of procedural issues is a failure of the justice [system]”.). 
 140. Those rules of valuating the evidence differ from the actual rules of the CPC, where the 
judge has to apply a legal valuation to each type of evidence according to and objective criteria 
stated by law. For example, Article 384 of the CPC expressly rules how judges have to valuate 
different situations that can be presented in a witness’ declaration.   
 141. See Omar Luis Diaz Solime, La Dinámica en la Carga Probatoria y la Conducta Proce-
sal de las Partes [The Dynamic in the Burden of Proof and the Procedural Conduct of the Par-
ties], in Revista de Derecho Procesal 347, 374 (2009) (Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas ed., Ma-
drid). 
 142. Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez, La Carga Dinámica de la Prueba [The Dynamic Allo-
cation of the Proof], 22 REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL [REV. DER. PROCESA] 263, 370 (2012). 
(The author has translated part of this source from Spanish to English for purposes of this article.) 
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According to the basic principle of the burden of proof, the patient that 
is seeking application of the rule has to prove that the injurer must pay 
damages to the injured and must provide sufficient evidence of facts 
that occurred. For a judicial action to succeed against the injurer, the pa-
tient must prove the negligence and capacity of the injurer, the existence 
of an injury, and the causal relationship between the action of the injurer 
and the injury suffered.  If the hospital refuses to cooperate with the 
process and opt to pay the fine or other sanction for not cooperating, 
then how can the patient provide all of these records owned by the hos-
pital? Or, from the court’s perspective, how can it issue a judgment oth-
er than dismissing the case if no relevant evidence is provided? 
According to the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine, in this 
case, given that the hospital is the owner of the relevant evidence and 
because the evidence is available, the court could release the plaintiff 
from his obligation to prove and require instead the hospital to prove 
that it acted according to the law.143  It represents a high level of diffi-
culty to an ordinary patient to prove that the scientific or medical pro-
ceedings were conducted improperly. 
However, this burden to prove a new fact does not mean that the 
other party (i.e. the plaintiff) is free from proving. Consequently, the 
party “who pretends the displacement of the burden of proof (. . .) has to 
have proved, even indirectly, that the other party is, or was, in better 
conditions to prove.”144 
2. Application of the Doctrine in Other Latitudes 
This doctrine is not new at a comparative level, and it has had an 
interesting development, mainly in Latin-American countries.145 We 
find similar regulation in different European countries and international 
conventions as well.146 I believe that having a worldwide perspective of 
this theory contributes to a proper comprehension of the doctrine. 
The Supreme Court of Colombia has adopted this doctrine in dif-
ferent cases.147 In a decision issued on November 3, 1977, in a medical 
malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Colombia ruled that “if the pa-
tient dies (. . .) and its heirs submit that the medical professional had 
 
 143. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL (L.E. CIV.) (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 217.7 
(Spain). 
 144. See Gonzalez, supra note 142, at 380.  
 145. See id.  
 146. Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 3, at 62-63. 
 147. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ. enero 30, 2001, M.P: J. 
Gomez, Expediente CCLXX-2509, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 5507) (Colom.) [hereinafter 
CCLLXX-2509]. 
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suspended or reduced the treatment, its the medic who has the burden to 
prove whether he did perform properly, whether he was legally excused 
to perform or whether if the practitioner would have performed the pa-
tient would have died anyway.”148  In another medical malpractice case 
the Court maintained its rule and argued that precisely in this sector of 
behavior that is connected to the required performance [in a medical 
malpractice case], it is not possible to establish absolute rules of burden 
to prove with no attendance to the discrete case.149 
In addition, the Colombian Constitutional Court has adopted this 
institution mainly to cases of human rights violations and forced dis-
placement.150 In a decision drafted by Justice Triviño on January 16, 
2009, ID T-006/09, the Constitutional Court ruled that the specific cir-
cumstances of the claimant, conduces to the reversal of the burden of 
proof, being a duty to the Government to prove that the assertions made 
by the claimant are not true and, therefore, there is not a situation of 
displacement.151 The claimant was an extremely low-income citizen of 
María la Baja, Bolivar Department, Colombia; who claimed that he was 
denied from receiving a regular stipend from a social program of the 
Government when he was unjustly removed from the list of beneficiar-
ies.152 The Government argued that the claimant was removed because 
he did not comply with the requirements of the list, so he was not enti-
tled to the benefit anymore.153 As stated above, the Court ruled that, in 
attendance to the particular circumstances of the claimant and the rele-
vance of the rights involved, the Government had the burden to prove 
that the claimant did not satisfy the requirements of the social benefit.154 
Argentina has also incorporated this rule in a statutory level (in 
both state and federal law) and has been developing this doctrine at a 
jurisprudential level as well.155 In addition to medical malpractice, it has 
been adopted in consumer right’s cases, insurance, billing disputes, la-
 
 148. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.J.S.] [Supreme Court], Sala. marzo 11, 1977, M.P,  Sen-
tencia, Gaceta Juridica [G.J.] (No. 2398, p. 332) (Colom.).  
 149. C.S.J., supra note 148, at 22. 
 150. See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 16, 2009, Sen-
tencia T-006/09, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/T-006-09.htm.  
 151. Id. at 13 (The author has translated part of this sentence for purposes of this article, and 
similar decisions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia can be found in the sentences T-1095, 
2008 and T-719, 2008). 
 152. Id. at 2-3.  
 153. Id.  at 3.  
 154. Id. at 6.  
 155. CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMMERCIAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE LA PAMPA [CÓD. PROC. 
CIV. Y COM. LP] [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE PROVINCE LA PAMPA] (B.O. 1828) 
(Arg.). 
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bor law and bankruptcy. The leading cases are Acosta156 in 1993 and 
Pinheiro157 in 1997. 
At the statute level, the Civil Procedural Code of La Pampa, Arti-
cle 360 paragraph 4 states that, without prejudice to the main rule of 
burden of proof, it has the burden to prove the facts the party that, at-
tending to the particular circumstances of the case, is, in terms of the 
tribunal, in better condition to arrive to the clarification of the facts.158 
The civil procedural codes of the provinces of Corrientes,159 San Juan160 
and Santiago del Estero161 have incorporated similar provisions. 
Article 189 of the General Procedural Code of Uruguay mandates 
the maximum cooperation of the parties when incorporating the evi-
dence to the process.162 Article 189.3 states that if the required party de-
nies to collaborate with the evidence after a judicial order, that negative 
shall be interpreted as a confirmation of the exactitude of the allegations 
over the facts that is sought to prove by the other party, unless there is 
evidence in the contrary.163 
The Spanish Civil Procedure Act of 2001 adopted in its Article 
217 this doctrine by stating different cases where the Defendant has the 
burden of proof (e.g. in case of unfair competition practices) and by 
stating that the tribunal, when allocating the burden of proof between 
the parties, “shall consider the availability and feasibility of the evi-
dence of the parties to the dispute.”164 
The Article 17.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational 
Civil Procedure, states that “[a]mong the sanctions [for failure or refusal 
to comply with obligations concerning the proceeding] that may be ap-
propriate against parties are: drawing adverse inferences; (. . .); ren-
dering default judgment; (. . .) and awarding costs in addition to those 
 
 156. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires [SCJ BAs] [Supreme Court 
of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires], 4/8/1992, “Acosta, Ramón Teófilo y otro v. Clínica 
Indarte S.A. y otro / recurso extraordinario inaplicabilidad de la ley”, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J. 
A.] (1993-IV-66) (Arg.). 
 157. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
10/12/1197, “Recurso de hecho deducido por la actora en la causa Pinheiro, Ana María y otro c/ 
Instituto de Servicios Sociales para el Personal Ferroviario” La Ley [L.L.] (Arg.).  
 158. CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y. COM. LP art. 360 (Arg.).   
 159. Id. art. 60. 
 160. CÓD. CIV. DE LA PROVINCIA DE SAN JUAN, art. 380 (Arg.). 
 161. CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMMERCIAL [CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 382 (B.D. 6910) (Arg.). 
 162. CÓD. GEN. DEL PROCESSO [General Procedural Code], LEY NO 15.982, art. 189.1 (1997) 
(Uru.). 
 163. Id. art. 189.3.  
 164. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL (L.E. CIV.) (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 217.7 
(Spain).   
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permitted under ordinary cost rules.”165  Also, Article 16.2 of the same 
corpus contains an interesting declaration that is applicable to the doc-
trine in analysis: “[i]t is not a basis of objection to such disclosure that 
the evidence may be adverse to the party or person making the disclo-
sure.”166 
The Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, regarding the “procedures and remedies necessary to ensure 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights,”167 states that when there 
is required and specified certain evidence in control of the other party, 
“the competent judicial authorities may order that such evidence be pre-
sented by the opposing party, subject to the protection of confidential 
information.”168 
In Germany this doctrine has been applied on a case-by-case basis 
more than from a common objective rule.  For instance, it has been ap-
plied mainly in cases of medical malpractice with grave wrongdoing by 
the faculty, in some consumers’ rights issues, in labor law disputes, in 
banking contracts and in some environmental issues.169 
In Italy, we find a specific statute provision that allows the judge 
to deduce proof arguments from the parties’ behavior during the pro-
cess.  Article 116 of the Italian Civil Procedural Code states that “the 
judge can imply arguments of evidence from the answers given by the 
parties, (. . .) from their unjustified refuse to consent inspections ordered 
by the judge and, in general, from the parties behavior showed in the 
context of the process.”170 
In England we find the “pre-action protocols” that are required in 
certain types of actions.  Those procedures have the purpose of facilitat-
ing the exchange of information and help to “allow [the parties] to un-
derstand each other’s position and make informed decisions about set-
tlement and how to proceed.”171  Regarding the sanctions for non-
compliance, “[t]he court will look at the overall effect of non-
compliance on the other party when deciding whether to impose sanc-
tions,”172 which include the stay of proceedings and the payment of the 
 
 165. American Law Institute, UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 2004-
4 UNIF. L. REV. 758, 790 (2004). 
 166. Id. at 788. 
 167. Council Directive 2004/48/CE., art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 19. 
 168. Id. art. 6.1, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16. 
 169. Los Angeles Gonzalez, supra note 142, at 375. 
 170. CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [C.p.c.][CIVIL PROCEDURAL CODE] art. 116 (It.).  
 171. Practice direction, pre action motion § 6.1(1), Ministry of Justice available at 
 http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/pd_pre-action_conduct#1.1  
 172. Id. § 4.5. 
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associated costs.173 
IV. THE DYNAMIC ALLOCATION OF BURDENS DOCTRINE AND THE US 
PLEADING STANDARD 
At this final stage, I try to propose a rule in order to raise in a prac-
tical way some of the issues that have to be considered when analyzing 
the incorporation of this doctrine into the judicial system. 
Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, let us assume that the fol-
lowing two modifications to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) have been adopted: 
First, adding the following new letter (g) to the Rule 37 “Failure to 
Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions” of the 
FRCP Chapter V: 
“(g) Dynamic Allocation of the Burden of Proof 
In cases of manifest disproportionality between the parties’ ac-
cess to the core evidence of the case, the court may allocate the 
burden of proof to the uncooperative or powerful party in ac-
cordance with the availability or feasibility of the same. The 
court shall notify the parties of its decision to allocate the bur-
den of proof in light of the consequences that the court deci-
sion may have on the parties’ obligation to present evidence.” 
Second, stating as a new ground to deny a motion to dismiss: the 
fact that the plaintiff is comprehended in the situation of the new Rule 
37(g). For instance, by adding as a new last paragraph of Rule 12(b)174 
of the FRCP the following: 
“A motion asserted under any ground of this Rule may be denied if 
the plaintiff is in the condition stated in [new] Rule 37(g).” 
A. Positive effects 
With this new set of rules, the court does not need to change its 
general plausibility standard when deciding a motion to dismiss. In cas-
es where the plaintiff that is facing a motion to dismiss argues the situa-
tion of the new Rule 37(g), the court does not have to say if the claim is 
or is not plausible. It just has to deny a motion to dismiss on grounds of 
the new paragraph of the Rule 12(b) if it believes that the conditions of 
Rule 37(g) are applicable to the plaintiff. 
Therefore, these modifications do not change the current pleading 
standard as a general rule, but preempt the early dismissal of cases 
 
 173. Id. § 6.1. 
 174. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
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where the manifest asymmetry between the parties makes one party 
control the core evidence of the case. As stated by Professor Kassem, 
the issue here is not to evaluate the plausibility requirement of the com-
plaint as “a factor of existential consequence.”175 
Furthermore, these proposals encourage the good performance of 
the parties regarding their discovery and disclosure duties. The party 
that has an advantage against the other party and controls the main evi-
dence of the case will know in advance that if he or she does not coop-
erate, the court may apply this doctrine as stated in the new Rule 37(g). 
That previous knowledge would encourage full commitment of the par-
ties with the process and is a good incentive to strengthen the good faith 
litigation principle. 
Besides, we have to consider that this tool necessarily raises evi-
dence that will help the jury in their fact-finding task. As stated by Mo-
rello, the efforts of the jurists [i.e. lawmakers] do not have to be cen-
tered in the allocation of the burden to prove, but in the court’s due 
diligence task to find the facts, without considering what the parties are 
or are not doing.176 Consequently, as the outcomes of the judicial system 
are going to be more accurate to the reality, the judicial error in the 
judgments is going to decrease, which will bring all the advantages that 
that means for the society. 
Also, this rule contains an important improvement in terms of the 
way in which the Government assures the access to justice to the people 
regardless of their social or economic conditions and their power rela-
tionship. It is a court’s tool designed to guarantee access to certain types 
of cases to receive a grounded pronouncement over the merits by a 
court. It reduces the cases that are won or lost because of procedural 
tricks and not on their merits. 
Finally, given that it represents an important tool that has to be 
used only in certain cases, it is the judge who has to decide (not a plain 
rule) whether a certain case fulfills the requisites of “manifest dispro-
portionality” regarding the proof availability, and then whether to apply 
or not this doctrine in such a case. The court is not mandated to use this 
institution; it is just a procedural mechanism that can be used.177 This 
 
 175. Kassem, supra note 24, at 1446. 
 176. AUGUSTO MORELLO, LA PRUEBA. TENDENCIAS MODERNAS. HACIA una VISION 
SOLIDARIA de la CARGA de LA PRUEBA [The Proof, Modern Tendencies. Towards a Solidary Ap-
proach of the Burden of Proof] 55 (Abeldo Perrot ed., 1911); see also Los Angeles Gonzalez, su-
pra note 142, at 372. 
 177. For the NCPC, and for almost all of the judicial systems abroad that have incorporated 
this doctrine, it is also considered as a power that the judge is not mandated to use, even if he es-
teems that the requisites are fulfilled.  
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feature is positive because it implements this tool in terms that do not 
promote frivolous or meritless litigation and promotes the possibility of 
being heard to grounded cases where it is impossible for the plaintiff to 
succeed in a motion to dismiss under the plausibility criterion. Also, by 
implementing this doctrine as optional, the exceptional nature of this ju-
dicial tool is reaffirmed. 
B. Due Process and Dynamic Allocation of Burdens Doctrine 
Although a constitutional analysis of this doctrine is both neces-
sary and interesting, it is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, I 
would like to raise a few constitutional issues that one has to take into 
account when analyzing this doctrine from a due process perspective. 
There are at least four aspects of the Due Process principle that are 
closely connected to the doctrine in analysis. First, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is understood as a limitation on arbi-
trary authority and a guarantee against all unreasonable legislation, 
“which demands that all laws shall not be unreasonable, capricious, or 
arbitrary.”178  Second, as asserted by the U.S. Supreme Court, due pro-
cess is not a technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances; rather, it “is flexible and calls for such proce-
dural protections as the particular situation demands.”179 Third, the cen-
tral meaning of “procedural due process” is that “[p]arties whose rights 
are to be affected are entitled to be heard.”180 Finally, even though we 
are analyzing this doctrine from a civil procedural perspective, it is im-
portant to take into account another comprehensive principle of the due 
process standard: the non self-incrimination principle.181 Therefore, any 
constitutional analysis has to consider, at least: whether the dynamic al-
location of burdens doctrine implies an unreasonable delegation of 
powers that judges can use arbitrarily; whether it affects the constitu-
tional right to be heard; and whether it implies a violation to the non 
self-incrimination principle. 
Regarding the critique that the dynamic allocation of burdens doc-
trine may be against the adversarial system and that it may imply a non-
desirable delegation of powers to the judge,182 one can provide two lines 
 
 178. Fela v. United States, Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 730 F. Supp. 779, 783 (N.D. Ohio 1989); see 
also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). 
 179. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
 180. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
 181. See Jonathan M. Rund, McKune v. Lile: Evisceration of the Right Against Self-
Incrimination Through the Revival of Boyd v. United States, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 409, 410 
(2003). 
 182. B. no. 8197-07 §IV.6 (a)-(b), supra note 6, at 25.  
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of arguments. First, the use of this power has to be requested by the par-
ty in those exceptional cases of manifest asymmetry between the parties 
and where one of them has total control over the core evidence of the 
case. Besides, it is always up to the judge to apply this doctrine: the 
court can deny it with no further reason.183 As described above, it is not 
conceived as a regular judge’s power to all cases, but only to some of 
them where the requirements are met.184 Second, by analyzing this doc-
trine by contrast to the current plausibility standard, one can raise the 
following questions. Is this a higher delegation of powers than the cur-
rent one at the pleading phase? Is it not more “inquisitorial” to have 
courts with the authority to set aside a claim if found “not plausible” 
with no evidence, cross-examination nor any minimum debate? 
Considering the constitutional right to be heard, I believe that this 
institution does not affect that guarantee but instead promotes it. This 
institution improves the opportunity to hear certain cases that under the 
current pleading standard are unable to pass a motion to dismiss. More-
over, the current pleading standard casts serious doubts over the protec-
tion of the right to be heard. Along with stating the right to notice and 
the opportunity to be heard, the Supreme Court has ruled that those re-
quirements have to be applied in a “meaningful manner.”185 Does the 
current plausibility pleading standard fulfill the opportunity to be heard 
in a meaningful manner? 
Additionally, the following argument addresses the assumption 
that with the application of this doctrine the court is obligating a party to 
prove against its own interests.186 Notwithstanding that the U.S. Su-
preme Court has ruled “that a violation of the constitutional right 
against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a 
witness against himself in a criminal case.”187 I believe that even if said 
principle is applied to noncriminal cases, the doctrine in the analysis 
does not affect it. First, the court is never going to require a party to 
prove against himself, but instead to prove the correspondent’s negative 
fact. Going back to the example of medical malpractice, the hospital 
need not prove that medical malpractice was committed, but instead 
must prove that it did not occur. Second, even though the borderline is 
not always clear, it is important to distinguish between the imposition to 
a party of the obligation to prove certain facts that affect its interests 
 
 183. Id. at 8197-07 §IV.4, §V.2(a), at 22.  
 184. Id. at 8197-07 §IV.1, §IV.4, §V.2(b), at 22, 35.  
 185. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 186. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003). 
 187. Id. at 770. 
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and the imposition of the obligation to present evidence that may af-
fect its interests. The first case clearly affects the Due Process rule, but 
the second evidently does not. 
Finally, I would like to briefly mention the recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski LLC (2014), where the 
main issue in dispute, from a procedural perspective, was the allocation 
of the burden of proof.188 It is a patent law case where the Court reaf-
firmed its long held case law that “the burden of proving infringement 
generally rests upon the patentee.”189 However, for purposes of this arti-
cle, the way it was decided is interesting. 
Medtronic (licensee) and Mirowski (patentee) had a licensing 
agreement where the licensee agreed to pay a fee to practice certain 
Mirowski patents.190 Later, the patentee notified the licensee of patent 
infringement by Medtronic, who then challenged that assertion of in-
fringement in a declaratory judgment action. The District Court recog-
nized that Mirowski was the defendant in the action, but concluded that 
Mirowski, as the party asserting the infringement, had the burden of 
proving infringement.191 The Federal Circuit disagreed and then the Su-
preme Court reversed, upholding the District Court’s decision on this 
issue.192 
These recent and thought-provoking decisions should be analyzed 
in-depth in an exclusive paper. The Supreme Court ruled that the party 
(licensee) that alleged there was no infringement by seeking a declarato-
ry judgment did not have the burden to prove the detailed facts that sus-
tained its case (i.e. that he or she has not breached the license agree-
ment), but the party against whom the action is served (patentee) 
regarding the existence of the infringement had the burden.193 Did the 
Court’s decision affect the defendant’s due process guarantees by re-
quiring him to bear the burden of proof? I believe it did not, because the 
core evidence of the case required to properly decide whether there is 
infringement, is on the defendant’s (patentee’s) side: where the evi-
dence is more available and feasible. In the same way, neither does the 
dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine. 
 
 188. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S.Ct. 843, 844 (2014). 
 189. Id. at, 849. 
 190. Id. at 846. 
 191. Id. at 847.  
 192. In Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the Court of 
Appeals held that considering the particular circumstances of this case, a party “seeking a declara-
tory judgment of non-infringement,” namely Medtronic, “bears the burden of persuasion.”   
 193. Id. at 1274.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Twombly and then in Iqbal, the Supreme Court of the Unites 
States changed the pleading standard, introducing the plausibility crite-
ria. Above, I have briefly argued and analyzed the undesirable effects of 
that shift. Then I discussed in a comparative way the Chilean Procedural 
Reform and its decisions concerning the pleading standard, including an 
analysis of the dynamic allocation of burden doctrine. Finally, I have 
drafted an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that in-
corporates that doctrine, to then briefly analyze its effects and highlight 
its positive and negative concerns. 
In the process of designing a procedural judicial system, all the ef-
fects and counter effects of every decision have to be balanced and put 
under permanent scrutiny. In the current scenario post Twombly and Iq-
bal, it seems to be very difficult for certain plaintiffs who claim justice 
with meritorious cases, to pass a motion to dismiss. That fact is a critical 
issue to every system of justice that seriously intends to grant fairness to 
its people. 
In this context, the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine is an in-
stitution that has to be considered, especially by those who think that the 
undesirable effects of Twombly and then of Iqbal need to be taken into 
account. As analyzed above, this judicial tool does not require changing 
the new plausibility rule; it only preempts the early dismissal of cases 
where the manifest asymmetry between the parties makes one party 
control the core evidence of the case; encourages good performance by 
the parties regarding their discovery and disclosure duties; and neces-
sarily raises evidence that will help the court (or jury) in its fact-finding 
task, reducing judicial error. 
The purpose of this paper is to bring attention to the current proce-
dural injustice of the first phase of the U.S. civil procedure, and to brief-
ly analyze an interesting antidote that, as noted above in section II, has 
been implemented in other latitudes. There are no absolute procedural 
rules to address the procedural inequalities that may affect the parties, 
and no absolute procedural rules to address every alternative that 
strengthens the compromise of the judicial system in granting justice to 
everyone who requires it. However, it has to be seriously taken into ac-
count. 
 
